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Donald K. Swearer Two types of saving 
knowledge in the Pali suttas 
Several studies have recently appeared which have dealt in whole or in part 
with the epistemology of Buddhism. They range from Jayatilleke's technical, 
philosophical-analytical argument that early Buddhism was rooted in a broadly 
based empiricism offering a middle way between nihilism and realism to 
Jacobson's more popularized efforts to use "modern concepts to elucidate old 
thoughts."1 In between these parameters are a number of more or less 
specialized studies from varying perspectives within Buddhism by Robinson, 
Wayman, Guenther, and others.2 
While such problems as the means of knowledge, the nature of Buddhist 
logic, the role of analysis, theories of meaning and truth, and the problem of 
the limits of knowledge all emerge from these discussions, the issue of what 
Herbert V. Guenther calls "levels of understanding" holds a particular in-
terest.3 Guenther's own exposition of the problem is based primarily on Tibetan 
Buddhist yoga texts. From that perspective he generalizes about Buddhism as 
a way to enlightenment or knowledge of reality. He contends that the Buddhist 
path involves a fundamental change of attitude from a "discursive cognitive 
situation" to an "intuitive cognitive situation."4 This distinction is another 
way of describing the differentiation between levels of understanding made in 
both Sanskrit and Pali texts between assumed or indirect meaning ( neyartha/ 
neyyattha) and real or direct meaning ( n'itarthajn'itattha). 
Whereas there is a definite delineation between levels of understanding or 
modes of knowing in Buddhism-whether they be two or three-they are not 
made essentially distinct. That is, as Guenther puts it, the relatively real and 
ultimately real are indivisible.5 This highest level of knowledge is mystical 
-not in the sense of absorption but in that it is immediate and nonproposi-
tional. In fact, states Guenther, it " ... is fundamentally empirical and realistic, 
taking into account the ineffability of the immediately given."6 
Although he writes from the base of Pali or Theravada Buddhism rather 
Donald K. Swearer is Associate Professor, Department of Religion, Swarthmore College. 
1 K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1963); Nolan Pliny Jacobson, Buddhism the Religion of Analysis (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1966). 
2 Cf. Guenther, "Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy," Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 86, no. 3 (Jul.-Sept., 1966): 297-305; Richard H. Robinson, "Mysticism 
and Logic in Seng-chao's Thought," Philosophy East and West 8, nos. 3 and 4 (1958-
1959): 99-120; D. T. Suzuki, "Reason (vijiiana) and Intuition (prajiili) in Buddhist 
Philosophy," in Essays in East-West Philosophy, ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1951), pp. 17-48; Alex Wayman, "Notes on the Sanskrit Term, Jiiana,'' 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 75, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1955): 253-268. 
3 "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," Journal of the American Oriental Society 
78, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1958): 19-28. 
4 Ibid., p. 19. 
5 Ibid., p. 22. 
6 Ibid., p. 26. 
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than the Mahayana perspective of Tibetan yoga, K. N. Jayatilleke's observa-
tions about the particular issue of levels of understanding in Buddhist episte-
mology are not as unlike those of Guenther as one might suppose. While he 
sees the epistemology of early Buddhism as fundamentally empirical rather 
than intuitive, he stretches the term empirical to include transempirical states 
(that is, nirvlitJa) and extrasensory data. Empirical knowledge, then, in 
Jayatilleke's usage is very similar to Guenther's claim that saving knowledge 
in Buddhism is "knowledge by acquaintance" and not "knowledge by descrip-
tion."7 Furthermore, just as Guenther contends that levels of understanding 
are distinct but that finally or ultimately there is only one truth, so J ayatilleke 
argues that in the Pali texts the two differing levels of understanding-direct 
( n'itattha) and indirect ( neyyattha )-lead to one truth. This truth or state 
of being cannot be described or understood rationally, but it can be realized 
and attained.8 Thus, like Guenther, Jayatilleke is claiming that although there 
are distinct levels of understanding or modes of knowing they are ultimately 
resolved in a nonpropositional truth which can be realized "intuitively" but 
not known discursively. 
A more general consideration of this issue, but one which is germane to 
a proposal I will make below, is offered by D.T. Suzuki. Suzuki juxtaposes 
discursive and intuitive levels of understanding in the terms of vijiianajniiiiiii~a 
and prajiiiifpaiiiili. He claims that the two are always contrasted in Buddhist 
thought: that vijiiana is the mode of knowledge appropriate to the world of 
the senses and the intellect characterized by the duality between the seer 
and the seen, and that prajiiii is the fundamental noetic principle whereby 
the synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible.9 As methods of 
knowing Suzuki finds vijiiana and prajiia standing diametrically opposed. 
Vijiiana is the principle of analysis and conceptualization whereas prajiia 
always aims at synthesis and unity. Yet, despite their differing functions, 
Suzuki believes the two complement each other and that vijiiana cannot 
function without being based in prajiia. P.T. Raju states Suzuki's point in the 
following manner, "thought [ vijiiana] cannot work without intuitions [prajiia] 
and intuitions cannot be understood without thought, and ... the distinctions 
between thought and intuition cannot be clear-cut."10 
Building on some of the suggestions from the studies cited above, I propose 
to investigate the problem of the relationship that may obtain between levels 
of understanding or modes of knowing in selected Pali suttas using viiiiii1~a 
and paiiiiii as the two fundamental types suggested by Guenther and J aya-
7 Ibid., p. 27. 
8 Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 476. 
9 Suzuki, op. cit., p. 17. 
10 "Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India," Philosophy East and West 2, no. 3 
(Oct., 1952) : 205, 
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tilleke. At the outset it is important to keep in mind that I am not using them 
as mutually exclusive terms, but as broad categories or types of knowledge 
which are-as suggested by both Guenther and J ayatilleke-distinct but 
related to each other within the experiential matrix of the soteriological quest. 
As viiiiiii1Ja and paiiiia are being considered primarily as types of knowledge 
it should not surprise the student of the Pali suttas that this study does not 
elaborate on the numerous passages where the distinction between the two 
words or the meaning of one or the other is ambiguous. Indeed, in both 
classical and Buddhist Sanskrit as well as in the Pali literature, passages can 
be found where the usage of one appears to be interchangeable with the usage 
of the other. As I have suggested, however, my intent is not to offer a 
historical exegesis of viiiiiii1Ja and paiiiia, but an interpretation of the problem 
of levels of knowledge in Theravada Buddhism focusing on these terms as 
types.U In doing so we shall address ourselves to three basic questions: 
what meaning(s) do the terms hold as distinct but related forms of conscious-
ness and modes of knowledge ; what is the nature of the relationship between 
the two; and, finally, do they presuppose each other as integral parts of the 
Buddhist salvation quest? These questions are basic to a consideration of 
the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in the Pali suttas of 
Theravada Buddhism. 
DISCRIMINATING KNOWLEDGE: VINNA~A 
In studying the category of discriminating or analytical knowledge several 
terms will be discussed but none is more significant than viiiiiti1Ja. The Pali 
word like the Sanskrit one etymologically means to 'distinguish, discern, 
observe, investigate or know'. As has been demonstrated by Franklin Edgerton, 
there is no clear definition of the meaning of vijiiana in the writings of classical 
Sanskrit. In the Upani~ads for example, vijiiana sometimes appears as the 
form of knowledge necessary for the realization of ultimate reality ( cf. Katha 
IV.lS, Chandogya VIII.7.1), but it also appears in more mundane contexts 
such as the knowledge of snake charming ( cf. Chiindogya VII.S.l). 
In the Pali canon, viiiiiii'}a is found to have several, differing meanings. 
It stands for "a mental quality as a constitutent of individuality, the bearer 
of (individual) life, life force . . . , general consciousness . . . (and) . . . 
may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly ex-
pressed by 'mind' ".12 0. H. de A. Wijesekera summarizes four basic ways 
11 Cf. the exceptionally helpful article by 0. H. de A. Wijesekera, "The Concept of 
Viii.ii.3.I)a in Theravada Buddhism," Journal of the American Oriental Society 84, no. 3 
(Jul.-Sept., 1964): 254-259. 
12 The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and William 
Stede (London: Luzac & Co., 1959), p. 618 (hereafter cited as Pali-English Dictionary). 
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in which vznna~a is used in the Pali canon: (a) cognitive or perceptive 
consciousness; (b) the surviving factor in the individual as denoted in 
particular by the term, sa1Jtvattanika viiiiili1Ja (the viiiiili~a that evolved) ; (c) 
the medium in which jhanic or spiritual progress takes place as implied by the 
expression viiiiia~a!fhiti (the stations of viiiiili1Ja) ; and (d) the basis of all 
consciousness and unconscious psychological manifestations pertaining to 
individuals within sarhsaric or empirical existence.13 Each of these usages 
clearly applies to the life of the individual within the phenomenal world ; 
nevertheless, as the basis of cognition and perceptive consciousness and as 
part of the means by which spiritual progress is gained, viiiiia1Ja becomes an 
important mode of knowledge relating to the Theravadin's quest for salvation. 
For the purposes of this study we shall focus on two fundamental uses of 
viiiiiatJa in the Pali Nikayas: viiiiia~a as consciousness or mind, and viiiiili1Ja 
as a mode of knowing. The fact that viiiiili~a is found to represent both a 
condition of consciousness as well as a type of knowledge will prove to be 
of the utmost significance. 
Viiiiia1Ja as consciousness or mind is nearly synonymous with two other 
important terms in the Pali canon, citta, and mano. Citta refers to the center 
of man's emotional and intellectual nature. The Pali Text Society's dictionary 
states that such English expressions as "heart and soul" best capture the 
meaning of citta and that it refers especially to the conative and emotional side 
of thought.14 As Mrs. Rhys Davids writes, "In citta we ... usually have man 
as affective and affected, as experiencing."15 Mano, on the other hand, is said 
to represent the intellective function of consciousness, especially as it is ex-
pressed in valuing, measuring, purposing, and intending.16 Viiiiili1Ja comple-
ments citta and mano by referring to perceptive and sensory activityP Despite 
these distinctions, however, in Samyutta Nikaya (II. 95), viiiiia1Ja, citta, and 
mano are equated and stand in opposition to kaya or body.18 Let us assume 
then, without further elaboration, that in the Pali suttas the terms citta, mano, 
and viiiiili1Ja were used either synonymously or as essentially related aspects of 
the same empirical consciousness. 
Two important characteristics of the empirical consciousness in early 
Buddhism demand our attention. The first is its impermanent nature, and the 
second may be characterized as the surviving factor in the individual within 
13 Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 295. 
14 Pali-English Dictionary, p. 266. 
15 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Bud-
dhism (London: Luzac & Co., 1935), p. 237 (hereafter cited as C. A. F. Rhys Davids, 
The Birth of Indian Psychology). 
16Ibid. 
17 Pali-English Dictionary, p. 618. Cf. also C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian 
Psychology, p. 245ff. 
lBibid. 
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samsanc or empirical existence. The impermanent nature of consciousness 
may be illustrated by this famous passage from the Samyutta Nikliya: "But 
this, brethren, that we call thought, that we call mind, that we call conscious-
ness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, whether by night or by day. 
Just as a monkey, brethren, faring through the woods, through the great forest 
catches hold of a bough, letting it go seizes another, even so that which we call 
thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, both 
by night and by day."19 
Elsewhere in the suttas it is made abundantly clear that the impermanence 
of the empirical consciousness is a result of its connection with the senses. That 
is, empirical consciousness appears to be dependent upon conditions created 
by the attachment of the senses to sense objects. As Majjhima Nikaya !.259 
puts it, "apart from condition there is no origination of consciousness."20 The 
same sutta goes on to say that visual consciousness arises because of eye and 
material shapes; auditory consciousness arises because of ear and sounds; 
olfactory consciousness arises because of nose and smells ; gustatory conscious-
ness arises because of tongue and tastes ; tactile consciousness arises because 
of body and touches ; mental consciousness arises because of mind and mental 
objects.21 The consequences of the fact that viiiiili1Ja arises through contact 
between the sense organs and sense objects are significant. It raises the ques-
tion of whether cognitive consciousness originates de novo from an empirical 
situation or simply begins to function when contact is made between the organ 
and the object of sense. Wijesekera supports the latter interpretation, insisting 
that the former would equate Buddhism with materialism in its theory of 
perception.22 For our purposes, the most significant point stems from the fact 
that viiiiili1Ja functions only in relationship to objects of sense, hence, creating 
the possibility-if not the necessity-of consciousness being tied to the mundane 
or phenomenal world. 
The dimension of this potential attachment to mundane objects is illustrated 
by the following passage from the Madhupi?Jrf,ika Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikliya: 
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and material 
shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (phassa) ; feelings 
( vedanli) are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives 
( saiijanliti) ; what one perceives one reasons about ( vitakketi) ; what one 
19 The Book of Kindred Sayings (Samyutta Nikaya) 5 vols., trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids 
and F. L. Woodward (London: Oxford University Press, 1917-1930), 2:66 (hereafter 
cited as The Book of Kindred Sayings). 
20 The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima Nikaya) 3 vols., trans. I. B. Horner (London: 
Luzac & Co., 1954-1959), 1:314 (hereafter cited as The Middle Length Sayings). 
21 The Majjhima Nikaya 3 vols., ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys 
Davids (London: Luzac & Co., 1888-1899), 1:295 (hereafter cited as Majjhima Nikl!ya). 
22 Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 255. 
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reasons about obsesses (papaiiceti) one; what obsesses one is the origin of the 
number of perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material 
shapes cognizable by the eye, past, future, present.23 
Here we find a direct connection between viiiiiii1Ja and papaiica, or conscious-
ness and obsession, illusion, obstacle, impediment resulting from the percep-
tions (saiiiiii) which are rooted in contact (phassa) between sense organ and 
object.24 
The empirical world presupposed by these texts might well be described as 
an arena of sensory presentations in which external objects are dependent 
upon a cognizing consciousness and vice versa. The empirical world of things 
and objects is not conceived of as independent of their cognition, just as 
cognition is not seen isolated from the objects which are cognized. Mrs. Rhys 
Davids emphasizes this point in regard to the nature of the mind or conscious-
ness by claiming that early Buddhism was not concerned with the "mind" but 
with "minding," that is, with mind in relationship to the objects of sensation 
and perception.211 This conception of the phenomenal world as a dynamic 
process of the interaction of sense objects, sense organs, and sense conscious-
ness factors is further illustrated by the development of the classification of the 
eighteen dhatus in later Pali literature. The dhatus, or fundamental bases of 
existence, include the six sense organs, their objects of contact, and the six 
forms of resultant consciousness ( viiiiiii1Ja). 
If, as the suttas assume, empirical realities are dynamic and fluid fields of 
distinct forms of consciousness interacting with sensory objects, it follows 
that impermanence will be one of the characteristic traits of the phenomenal 
world. Since objects and consciousness are symbiotically related in a state of 
constant interdependence, it is impossible to discover any degree of permanence 
within the sensory realm. As E. R. Sarachchandra writes: "We perceive forms 
with our eyes, hear sounds with our ears and get attached to them. But the 
things we get thus attached to are constantly changing ... (and) the world 
of constant change has no permanent reality."26 The "obsessed" (papaiica) 
consciousness is bound to objects of sensory perception, mistaking empirical 
objects as permanent entities when, in fact, they are only objects of conscious-
ness changing from moment to moment as our perceptions of them change. 
If the phenomenal world is viewed as partially or largely shaped by con-
sciousness ( viiiiiii1;ta), then, on one level, consciousness functions as the 
medium in which empirical existence takes place. In this capacity viiiiiii1;ta has 
23 Majjhima NiklJya, 1:111-112. 
24 Pali-English Dictionary, p. 412. 
211 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, op. cit., p. 234£. 
26 Buddhist Psychology of Perception (Colombo: The University of Ceylon Press, 1958), 
p. 11. 
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the power to effect the origination or cessation of the world.27 Another 
consequence is that vinnli1Ja becomes the sine qua non for the birth, growth, 
and development of conscious existence within the phenomenal world.28 In 
a dialogue between Ananda and the Buddha in the Mahanidana Suttanta 
of the Digha Nikliya, for example, the Buddha states that viniili1Ja is the cause 
of name and form (nama rupa), that if consciousness ( viniili?Ja) were not to 
descend into the mother's womb there would be no birth, and that without 
consciousness there would be no further evolution of life.29 This nearly 
quasi-substantive conception of viiiiili1Ja is, in the opinion of Wijesekera, also 
expressed in the terms, saf!tvattanika-viiinli1Ja (rebirth-consciousness), and 
viiiiia1_Za-sota (stream of consciousness) or bhava-sota (stream of becoming).30 
V iniili1Ja as mind or consciousness, in brief, is an expression of a mode 
of becoming, a condition characterized by diversity and impermanence. In 
this usage viiiiia1Ja does not mean full cognition but is " ... a sort of anoetic 
sentience that occurs before the object is completely apprehended."31 At this 
level, viiiiili1Ja represents no formal power or control in and of itself, but rather 
the formless weakness and pain (dukkha) of disordered chaos. It is con-
sciousness which arises when sense objects stimulate sense organs. Perhaps 
it could be said that at this stage viiiiili1Ja is merely reactive consciousness or 
awareness. It is, therefore, a state of nonfreedom, of dependence upon phe-
nomenal diversity and bondage to the objects of sense. It is, as it were, a 
universal human condition from which man must extract himself. 
The condition of bondage to plurality and impermanence is, indeed, the 
profane in its most radical connotation. The Theravadin's quest for salvation 
is to escape from this condition, to negate its threat of confusion and disorder. 
But where are the possibilities for creating a sacred cosmos from this chaos? 
Do they lie within man's own consciousness or is the source only to be found 
in some outside force? These questions bring us to a second basic use of 
viiiiili1Ja in the Pali Nikayas, namely, viiinatJa as a mode of knowledge. 
Oues as to the nature of this knowledge are found throughout the suttas. 
For example in the Dhatu Vibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, viiinatJa 
as the sixth dhatu beyond the five bases or elements of earth, water, fire, air 
and space is characterized as a knowledge which is able to distinguish between 
pleasure and pain, one of the fundamental dualities of the phenomenal world.32 
Sukha and dukkha refer not simply to pleasure and pain as psychological 
27 Ibid. 
28 Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 255. 
29 The Digha Nikaya, 3 vols., ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter (London: 
Luzac & Co., 1903-1911), 2:62 (hereafter cited as Digha Nikaya). 
30 Wijesekera, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 
31 Sarachchandra, op. cit., p. 4. 
s2 Majjhima Nikaya, 2:242. 
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components of existence in the sensory world, but to its ontological character 
as well. Viiiiiii1Ja, therefore, as knowledge of the distinction between pleasure 
and pain or happiness and suffering, appears to be a discriminating mode of 
knowledge in regard to the true nature of reality. An identical use of viiiiiii1Ja 
is found in the Mahavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya where it is said 
that by viiiiiii1Ja one discriminates the pleasurable from the painful and the 
neutral.83 In the same sutta, the text goes on to say that viiiiiii1Ja is called 
knowledge because one discriminates by means of it ( vijanati ti . . . tasma 
viiiiiii1Jan ti vuccati) .34 Furthermore in the Vimamsaka Sutta of the M ajjhima 
Nikaya it is said that "the Tathagata should be examined in order to know 
( viiiiiii1Jiiya) whether he is perfectly enlightened or not."35 Viiiiiii1Ja in these 
instances must be seen as a mode of knowledge or a cognitive state which, 
by its power of discrimination, has within itself the possibility of becoming 
more than mere sensory awareness. It has, in other words, at least some 
power of self-transcendence. 
Viiiiiii1Ja in the Pali Nikayas, in brief, presents two different possibilities 
which fit well into our interpretative schema. It can mean, on the one hand, 
man's empirical consciousness which by nature is bound to the objects of 
sense. This level may be considered as the profane, when that which is most 
essential to human existence (that is, viiiiiii1Ja) is bound by its attachment to 
sensory objects and totally without self-controlling power. On the other hand, 
viiiiiii1Ja as a mode of knowledge implies that it has the power of transcending 
involvement in the sensory world; thus, in the Kevaddha Sutta of the D'igha 
Nikaya it is asked: 
Where do earth, water, fire and wind, 
And long and short, and fine and coarse, 
Pure and impure, no footing find? 
Where is it that both name and form 
Die out, leaving no trace behind? 
On that the answer is: 
The intellect ( viiiiia1Ja) of Arahatship ... 36 
It rests within viiiiiii1Ja itself to progress toward the ultimate. This progress 
is a result of knowledge attained through a discriminating understanding of 
the impermanent nature of the phenomenal world. 
33 Ibid., 1:292. Cf. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 434£. 
S4Majjhima Nikiiya, 1:292. 
35Jbid., 1:318£. 
86 The Dialogues of the Buddha (Dikha Nikiiya) 3 vols., trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and 
C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Sacred Books of the Buddhists (London: Luzac & Co., 1899-
1921), 1:283. 
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This progression is marked in particular by a scheme of spiritual training 
or meditation known as jhana or samiipatti, the context in which the question 
of saving knowledge arises. Without digressing into this arena, it will be 
merely noted that the acquisition of spiritual states is a refinement of con-
sciousness ( viiiiiii1Ja). Such a progressive refinement is indicated by the 
so-called seven stations of consciousness. These describe the movement of 
viiiiia1Ja from consciousness of matter, to the dying out of the consciousness 
of sense-reaction, to the turning away from consciousness of the manifold, to 
the consciousness of infinite space, to the consciousness of infinite conscious-
ness.37 Here is represented a freeing of viiiiia1Ja from attachment to the mun-
dane to a more universal awareness of the nature of itself and of reality. Such 
liberation is denoted even more forcefully by other terms in the Pali Nikayas 
which must be briefly mentioned. 
Viiiiia?Ja is able to rise above its bondage to the world of sense objects 
through the power engendered by objective analysis. This form of transcend-
ing knowledge, is illustrated by a cluster of related words denoting reflective 
cogitation, contemplative observation and rational discrimination. Among 
them are included such terms as, v'ima?J"sii, anupassanii, patisankha, pafisaiicik-
khati, and peccavekkhati.3S 
Vima1Jtsii denotes consideration, examination and investigation.89 In its use 
in the suttas it is frequently associated with the attainment of higher powers, 
praiseworthy concentration, and even insight into the nature of ultimate reality 
itself. Thus in D'igha Nikaya III.222, v'ima1Jtsii-samadhi is one of the four 
stages to iddhi or supranatural powers; in the Anguttara Nikaya mma?J"sii 
is described in "The Book of the Tens" as one of the conditions of the higher 
life of the Buddhist saint ;40 and in Anguttara !.297, insight into the nature 
of the ultimate appears to be contingent on a detached examination ( vima?J"sii) 
of " ... resentment, infatuation, wrath, enmity, hypocrisy, delusion, treachery, 
stubborness, impetuosity, pride . . . (etc.) "41 
A nupassanii, denoting contemplation, observation, looking at, is also essential 
to the development of true wisdom.42 For example, through anupassanii the 
bhikkhu analyzes his body into such components as feelings and mind, and 
understands their impermanent nature.43 Furthermore, it is said to lead to a 
37 Digha Nikaya, 3:253; 2:68. 
38 Important terms omitted from this list are viciira and vitakka. They are, in my opinion, 
more appropriately discussed in relationship to jhana. 
39 Pali-English Dictionary, p. 644. 
40 The Book of Gradual Sayings (Anguttara Nikaya) 5 vols., trans. F. L. Woodward 
and E. M . Hare (London: Oxford University Press, 1932-1936), 5:65 (hereafter cited 
as The Book of Gradual Sayings). 
41 Ibid., 1:297. 
42 Pali-English Dictionary, p. 39. 
43 The Book of Kindred Sayings, 5:261. 
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" ... vision of things not taught before ... ," to knowledge, insight, wisdom 
and light.44 A related term, samanupassanli, is seen to be integral to the means 
by which the hindrances ( nivara1Ja) blinding the individual to higher realities 
are overcome. 45 
An important stage in the development of viniiii1Ja beyond bare sensory 
consciousness is the simple act of being objectively aware of particular human 
acts and activities, especially those conducive to the pleasure of the senses. 
Thus the Majjhima Nikaya admonishes the monk to reflect carefully (pafisan-
khii) while eating, and to think over (pafisaiicikkhati) the householder life.46 
Reflective thought is like a mirror which catches the image of every act and 
thought of the person; hence, the Buddha admonishes Rahula to reflect 
(paccavekkhati) again and again in doing every act, speaking every word, 
and thinking every thought.47 
The consequences of analytical and reflective thought, on the one hand, are 
ethical. By the power of discrimination ( bala pafi sankhiina) one abandons 
" ... immorality of deed in body, speech and thought ... and conducts himself 
in utter purity."48 Patisankhiina, however, also leads to bhiivana, "cultivation," 
"making-become," which is conducive to yet higher goals of mindfulness and 
detachment.49 Analytical or discriminative knowledge, therefore, represents 
not only self-conscious awareness or even rational understanding but is also 
the power by which the individual becomes "other" than he is. In discriminat-
ing, analytical thought inherent in consciousness ( vinnil1Ja) itself, there rests 
the power of changing the very structure of life. Through the attainment of 
knowledge, the individual is able to control his environment rather than be 
controlled by it. Viiinii1Ja comes to mean not merely a sensory consciousness 
dispersed among the multifarious and impermanent object-realities of the 
empirical world, but a consciousness which has analyzed and understood that 
world to the point of controlling and, hence, transcending it. 
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE: PANNA 
We have seen that vinna1Ja characterizes mundane existence both as the ground 
of sentient existence and as the means of enabling the individual to gain power 
44 Ibid., 5: 157. 
45 Digha Nikaya, 1:73. 
46 Majjhima N ikaya, 1:273. 
47 Ibid., 1:415. 
48 The Book of Gradual Sayings, 1:47. 
49 Ibid., 1:48. Mrs. Rhys Davids has discussed the word bhlivanli, in several of her writings. 
See her Sakya or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1931), 
p. 93£. Although she has been justly criticized for interpreting this and similar terms to 
mean becoming more of a "self," the notion of bhavanli as "making-become" or becoming 
other than what one presently is, represents a helpful interpretation. That is, early 
Buddhism clearly implies that right knowledge brings about a change of one's being. 
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over himself and his world. As a mode of knowledge, vinna1Ja functions soterio-
logically as a means to a higher reality. This reality, on one level of discourse, 
can be identified as nibbiina. As a polar term to vinna1Ja, however, it may also 
be discussed as intuitive knowledge or panna. In our usage, panna represents 
both the nature of consciousness vis-a-vis the ultimately real as well as the mode 
of knowing ultimate reality. Vinnii1Ja and panna are both forms of consciousness 
and modes of knowledge, although they differ in function and type. The 
function of viniia1Ja as a mode of knowledge is primarily to help control the 
consciousness through analytical and discriminating understanding of the em-
pirical world. This control function is not an end in itself, but rather points 
beyond itself to a higher end or goal. Paiiiia, on the other hand, does not 
function as a control but rather as a release, a freeing of the consciousness to 
a knowledge of the Ultimate itself, a knowledge defying the categories of 
rational discrimination. In this sense paiiiiii may be classified as a nonrational, 
intuitive or a synthetic type of knowledge in contrast to viiiiia1Ja as a rational 
and analytical type. 
In the Nikayas the condition of mundane existence is loss of freedom 
because consciousness ( viniiii1Ja) is bound to empirical objects through sensory 
perceptions ( saiiiia). It has been shown, furthermore, that vinna1Ja has the 
power within itself to rise above mere sensation to higher cognitive states. 
By means of rational analysis, viniiii1Ja perceives the implicit dualities and 
conflicts typical of the empirical world. It thereby progresses to higher and 
higher levels of understanding which, however, are still qualified by an inevita-
ble attachment to the senses. Eventually a point is reached where this attach-
ment is broken, and there emerges a new way of knowing and being. 
The A11anjasappaya Sutta of theM ajjhima Nikaya discusses this progression 
and change in a form typical of the suttas. It points out that perceptions ( saniiii) 
related to sense desires (kama) are ruled by Mara, hence, resulting in an evil 
and inunoral consciousness.50 This condition can be changed only when con-
sciousness ( citta) is developed to a level of true permanence ( a1Jaiija) which 
is the highest attainment of wisdom (panna) .51 As another passage in the 
Majjhima Nikaya puts it, perfect knowledge (anna) comes only through 
gradual training, 52 attainment, and progress. 53 One of the most obvious illustra-
tions of the fact that panna results from an extended period of discipline and 
gradual training is the division of the Noble Eightfold Path into the categories 
of s'ila, samadhi, and panna. Wisdom or true knowledge (panna) is fully 
50 Majjhima Nikaya, 3:262. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Anna generally refers to perfect knowledge, the knowledge of Arahatship, saving 
knowledge. The use of paiiiia I am developing in this article is identical with this meaning 
of aiiiia. 
ll3 M ajjhima Nikaya, 1:479. 
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achieved only at the conclusion of a period of development, the length of which 
depends upon the spiritual ability and the effort of the individual concerned. 
The goal achieved by this progressive realization is above all a goal charac-
terized by freedom ( vimutti). Again and again the suttas point to the fact 
that one who enters the way ( magga) to salvation has entered on the freedom 
of the consciousness ( cittovimutti), freedom through intuitive wisdom (panna-
vimutti) .54 Such freedom is likened to abhinna, a suprarational knowledge, 
which is perfect.55 The model of the religieu.x par excellence is one who is 
endowed with intuitive wisdom (panna) and freedom ( vimutti) or a "knowl-
edge-vision-freedom" ( vimuttina1padassana) .56 
Freedom by itself is, of course, merely an abstraction and the Pali suttas are 
quite concrete about that from which the individual of intuitive wisdom is 
freed. In brief, the man of citto panna vimutti is freed from those attachments 
to the objects of the phenomenal world controlling his consciousness, blinding 
him to an awareness of his true nature and the world in which he lives, and 
proscribing his ability to transcend himself and his environment. The word 
used in the Pali texts for this binding attachment to the phenomenal world 
is asava, literally an "outpouring." Through ignorance (avijja), sensuous 
desire (kama), and the wish for becoming ( bhava) an individual is literally 
"poured out" into the material world. He is defined by all of the objects and 
immediate goals of the world of sensory reality; hence, a condition of freedom 
becomes absolutely impossible. 
Freedom in any religious tradition, of course, is more than merely freedom 
from. It is a freedom to as well. Early Buddhism is no exception to this rule. 
In this case it is a freedom to panna, a new insight ( vipassana) and seeing-
knowing ( na1pa-dassana). The individual who has attained to panna, having 
overcome the impediments of the senses, is enabled to know in a new way. 
It is a knowing no longer tied to the fields of sense, to sense objects and 
organs in the manner of empirical consciousness. Panna, then, represents the 
new consciousness of "rebirth" or transformation. It is the noumenal con-
sciousness empowered to know not only the true nature of phenomenal reality, 
but ultimate reality itself. Because it represents a mode of consciousness like 
vinna1Ja, panna is able to perceive the ultimately real "face-to-face" just as 
vinna1Ja is able to perceive the phenomenal world as it really is. Panna, therefore 
has been called an extrasensory "seeing" ( dassana) or perception. 57 It is a 
form of perception in that it knows directly, but it is extrasensory in that it 
is not dependent upon the senses or the objects of sense. 
Panna as insight (vipassana) is the knowledge of the nature of things, or 
54 Ibid., 1:77. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 J ayatilleke, op. cit., p. 432. 
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the knowledge and insight of things as they are (yatha bhuta iiatJadassana) .58 
If you will, it is the acknowledgment of the impermanence ( anicca) of the 
phenomenal world and its inherent suffering ( dukkha), but from the perspec-
tive of the knowledge of nibbana rather than from the perspective of the 
mundane. It is possible for the empirical consciousness to arrive at a cognizance 
of the impermanence of the phenomenal world by rational methods, but until 
that knowledge is realized from the perspective of the ultimately real its 
consequences are limited. The knowledge of the nature of things is that aspect 
of paiiiia described in the two stages of the Noble Eightfold Path as right 
views and right intentions. Within the Theravada tradition it is most often 
characterized as the Four Noble Truths. 
Knowledge of the nature of things is not sufficient for salvation. It must be 
supplemented by the knowledge-and-vision of things, that is, absolute freedom 
( vimutti-iiatJadassana). It is the knowledge attained by the Buddha at his 
enlightenment when he is reported to have said, "there arose in me the 
knowledge and insight that my salvation is unshakable, that this is the last 
birth and that there is no further birth."59 "Freedom-knowledge" complements 
"nature-of-things knowledge." The latter is the knowledge of things as they 
are empirically seen from the perspective of what they might become, whereas 
the former grasps this truth in the light of the ultimately real ( nibbiina). The 
insight of panna, therefore, may speak in descriptive terms of impermanence, 
conditionality and so on, but the "vision" aspect of panna makes only such 
simple assertions as emptiness ( sunna) and signlessness ( animittata). 
As Edward Conze points out, the term sunna is not used in the Theravada 
tradition as extensively as anicca or impermanence ;60 nevertheless, its limited 
use serves as an important means by which to indicate the vision aspect of 
panna. References occur in the Anguttara Nikaya where the Buddha is made 
to say that his discourses are " ... deep and deep in meaning, transcendental, 
dealing with the Void (sun nata) ... " ;61 the Culasuiiiiata Sutta describes a 
method for the development of a true, changeless, and pure emptiness ;62 and 
the .Akankheyya Sutta refers to the monk who is calmed ( samatha) and who 
has transcended every perceptual form as a "cultivator of empty places."68 
As the last reference indicates, suniia returns us to the notion of panna as 
freedom of the mind or consciousness ( cetovimutti). This freedom may be 
best delineated in the suttas in the sequence of appamiitJa (immeasurable), 
58 For a discussion of vipassaniJ. by a contemporary meditation teacher see the detailed 
presentation by Ledi Sayadaw, "The Manual of Insight" [VipassantJ. Dipani] The Wheel 
31/32 (Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1961). 
59 M ajjhima N ikaya, 1: 167. 
60 Buddhist Thought in India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 59. 
61 The Book of Gradual Sayings, 1:68. 
62 M ajjhima Nikaya, 3: 104. 
68Jbid., 1:33. See also The Middle Length Sayings, 1:41. 
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akiiicaiina (nothingness), suiiiiata (emptiness) and animittata ( signless-
ness) .64 Suiiiiatacetovimutti or "freedom of the mind that is emptiness" refers 
to the fact that essential reality abides beyond the particulars of the phenomenal 
world. The above limited references appear to indicate that salvation-knowledge 
as suiiiia denotes not only the negation of form associated with phenomenal 
world but also a reality beyond form. Panna perceives this reality as suiiiiata, 
not mere emptiness, but as that ultimately real which gives meaning to the 
world of multiplicity. 
Along with suiiiia or suiiiiata, the term animittatii ( signlessness) is an 
important nondescriptive indicator of the "freed mind" or consciousness ( ceto-
vimutti) .65 It denotes more than the inadequacy of the human intelligence to 
grasp the ultimately real. It implies, rather, that human consciousness operating 
on a higher level (that is, panna) can, indeed, know the ultimately real, that 
universal and absolute ground which by definition transcends the limits of 
finite knowledge. 
Theravada Buddhism makes the optimistic claim that a man can know the 
ultimately real by his own efforts. To truly know this reality is to know it 
directly and to know directly assumes that one participates in that reality. It 
is, therefore, of utmost importance that salvation-knowledge or panna is 
described as a "seeing-knowing" ( iiiina-dassana) . Since what is "seen" is 
radically other than what is ordinarily perceived, the vision aspect of paiiiiii 
must also be radically other than the modes of knowledge appropriate to the 
mundane world. I£ this claim is accurate, that is, if panna as niina-dassana 
is decisively other than empirical consciousness or viiinaJJa, then the nature 
of the relationship between these two forms of knowing becomes a crucial 
question. Do they in some way complement each other or are they so radically 
different in nature and function that finally there is no relationship between 
the two? 
Writing in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, La Vallee Poussin uses a 
dialogue among the monks, Savittha, Musi:la, and Narada in the Samyutta 
Nikaya as a typology to represent two differing approaches to nibbiina, the 
rational and the mystical. In the dialogue Savittha asks Musi:la and Narada 
whether "apart from belief, apart from inclination, apart from hearsay, apart 
from argument as to method, apart from reflection on and approval of an 
opinion" did they have a knowledge of the conditioned nature of the phenomenal 
world and that the ceasing of it was nibbana.66 Musila replied that he knew 
(janati) and saw (passati) ; hence, for him the hindrances ( asavas) to the 
ultimately real had been stripped away and he had attained to Arahatship. 
84 Majjhima Nikaya, 1:297. 
65 Ibid., 1:296. 
66 The Book of Kindred Sayings, 2:81-82. 
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Narada for his part, stated that he had the right insight that the "ceasing of 
becoming" was nibbana but that he was not an Arahat for whom the intoxicants 
had perished.67 Louis de la Vallee Poussin comments: 
"Musila et Niirada ... representent assez bien le 'rationalisme' et Ia 'mystique.' 
Musila possede 'la saintete' parce qu'il 'sait' ou 'connait.' Narada ne se con-
sidere pas comme un saint parce qu'il n'a pas touche le Nirv~u}.a avec son corps. 
On peut, sans imprudence, discerner dans les sources bouddhiques, anciennes 
ou scholastiques, deux theories opposees, ... la theorie qui fait du salut une 
oeuvre purement ou surtout intellectuelle; la theorie qui met le salut au bout 
des disciplines, ascetiques et extatiques."68 
Without venturing further into the details of La Vallee Poussin's argument, 
the general perspective that the "intellectual" and the "ecstatic" or "rational" 
and "mystical" are two opposing means to the ultimately real in Pali Buddhism 
is severely challenged by an analysis of vinnatta and panna. 
One of the most important suttas in the Nikayas illustrating the nature of 
the relationship between the rational-analytical and the mystical-intuitive ap-
proaches to the ultimately real is the Mahlivedalla Sutta in the Majjhima 
Nikaya. There, in a dialogue between the venerable Siiriputta and Kotthita 
the Great, the issue of the relationship between "intuitive wisdom" (panna) 
and "discriminating consciousness" ( vinniit~a) is enjoined. A person is said 
to be "intuitively wise" when he comprehends suffering, the arising of suffering, 
and suffering's cessation.69 Discriminating consciousness is so called because 
it discriminates ( vijanliti) pleasure and pain and what is not pleasure and 
pain. 70 Having so delineated the natures of panna and viniiatta, Kotthita asks 
Sariputta if the two are associated or dissociated, a question to which Sariputta 
replies, "That which is intuitive wisdom, your reverence, and that which is 
discriminative consciousness, these states are associated, not dissociated . . .. "71 
Within the soteriological quest the two forms of knowledge seem to presuppose 
one another so that, ultimately, any absolute distinction becomes impossible: 
"Whatever one comprehends . . . that one discriminates ; whatever one dis-
criminates that one comprehends . . . ."72 Accepting the proposition that 
viniiat~a and panna are associated Kotthita then asks in what way they differ. 
To this question Sariputta replies that panna is to be developed whereas 
viiiiiiitta is "for apprehending.''73 Perhaps this reply offers another way of 
67 Ibid. 
68 "Musna et Narada: Le Chemin du NirvaJ;~a, "Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques," 5 
(Jul., 1937): 189-190. 
69 Majjhima Nikaya, 1:292. 
70 Ibid. 
11Ibid. See also The Middle Length Sayings, 1:351. 
12Majjhima Nikaya, 1:292. 
78 Ibid., 1:293. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 17 Jun 2015 19:37:04 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
370 Swearer 
expressing Jayatilleke's contention that viiiiiatta seems to apply to "cognition" 
in general, whereas paiiiia applies more specifically to the understanding and 
development of "spiritual truths."H In any case, this dialogue provides a 
specific illustration of the symbiotic relationship that may be said to exist 
between viiiiiatta and paiiiia in the suttas. 
In conclusion, let me summarize what appears to be a recognizable and 
justifiable position vis-a-vis a typology of saving knowledge in the Pali suttas. 
Both viiiiiatta and paiiiia can be interpreted to mean consciousness, the former 
the consciousness apropos of the phenomenal and the latter apropos of the 
noumenal. V iiiiia~~a as empirical consciousness has an innate tendency to 
become attached to things and, hence, to lose its freedom. In fact, viiiiiatta 
cannot be conceived except in terms of sensory spheres, that is, consciousness, 
sense organs and sense objects. Within itself however, viiiiiatta has the power 
to rise above mere sensation or sensory perception. By analytic means it can 
recognize the impermanence and essencelessness of the phenomenal world. A 
higher reality, however, can only be assumed. Viiiiiatta cannot know the ulti-
mately real itself precisely because this reality transcends the senses to which 
viiiiiatta is bound. It is at this point that paiiiia comes into the picture; for, 
whereas viiiiiatta might recognize the dualities of phenomenal reality (e.g., 
pleasure and pain), it cannot know the implications of these dualities from the 
perspective of the realization of nibbana. Paiiiia, as I have suggested, fulfills 
both of these functions. That is, paiiiia as the noumenal consciousness has a 
transcendental insight ( vipassana) into the nature of the phenomenal world, 
as well as a direct vision ( dassana) of the ultimately real. Paiiiia, therefore, 
represents the freeing of the mind or consciousness ( citto mano viiiiiatta 
vimutti) to an unlimited realization, the undesignated totality which the 
ground of being represents in all religious traditions. 
Having developed such a seemingly definitive position, I must quickly 
reiterate a qualification made at the outset of this study. The Pali suttas do 
not present a consistent view of either viiiiiii1Ja or paiiiia. I have, therefore, 
within the limitations of my analysis, imposed a schematization or a typology 
on materials in the Pali texts that are, in fact, much more ambiguously defined. 
In defense of this interpretation, however, two points must be made: (a) 
there is support for the general position taken both within the suttas and by 
scholars of Buddhism; and (b) my primary purpose has not been to offer an 
exegesis of the Pali suttas but to arrive at an interpretative understanding 
of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in Theravada Buddhism. 
As a postscript to this interpretation of saving knowledge in the Pali suttas, 
a general comment might be in order regarding later developments in Bud-
dhism. In the Pali sutta literature, I have contended that the two levels of 
74 Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 435. 
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understanding or modes of knowledge represented as viiiiiii1Ja and panna pre-
suppose each other as integral parts of the path to the ultimate goal, nibbana. 
Subsequent developments, however, seemed to associate each mode of knowl-
edge with differing trends of Buddhist thought. The Abhidhamma tradition of 
the Theravadins or Ceylonese Vibhajavadins appears to take the analytical 
mode to one extreme and the Madhyamika School of the Mahayana does the 
same with the intuitive mode. This claim is not to suggest that the Abhidham-
mika elaboration of the categories of citta, cetasika, and rupa is necessarily 
inimical to the realization of nibbana, nor that the Madhyamika emphasis on 
prajiia as the integral principle comprehending all aspects of cognition had 
no relationship to analysis; however, in each case different levels of under-
standing become the focus of attention. 
Both trends are anticipated in the Pali suttas where the two modes of knowl-
edge are symbiotically related. As is often the case in the history of religion, 
however, those elements which exist in dynamic tension in the early phases 
of a tradition may become separated and sometimes dangerously isolated in 
its later phases. This observation is not intended to cast a negative light on 
either the much maligned Abhidhammika tradition or the much admired 
Madhyamika. Rather, it is meant to suggest that common problems from 
different streams of Buddhism are often more clearly understood in the light 
of Pali sutta material. 
